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Food safety remains a major issue to many consumers. Previous studies examining the
economic impact of food safety recalls have focused on Class I recalls. Antibiotic residue
in meat products, a Class II recall, has increased in consumer importance yet little is
known about how much research and development expenditure should be allocated to
reduce antibiotic residue pre- and post-harvest. This study compares demand elasticities
and the decrease in willingness to pay in response to either an E. coli (Class I) or
antibiotic residue (Class II) recall. We compare and contrast two competing behavioral
frameworks, Random Utility and Regret Minimizing. Modeling behavior using the random
regret framework is found to be more powerful for assessing consumer responses. In
addition, we explore if different groups of consumers exist that either maximize utility
or minimize regret. Consumer devaluations of E. coli (Class I) are 40–65% larger than
antibiotic residue (Class II). Approximately 60% of consumers are identified as regret
minimizers and 40% were identified as utility maximizers. While industry response and
government policy recommendations differed conditional on modeling framework, the
regret minimizing framework required smaller price discounts than regret minimizing to
maintain the same level of market share.
Keywords: antibiotic residue, E. coli, food recall, discrete choice analysis, random regret minimization, random
utility maximization

INTRODUCTION
Consumers trust government regulatory agencies to ensure food products are safe to eat and
to publicize product recall notifications when food safety breaches occur. Potential long-term
economic losses along the food supply chain due to food safety events are particularly concerning
given potential loss of consumer confidence. Furthermore, recalls can endure for several months,
as product hazards can take time to identify and trace. By the time that these tasks have
been completed, many products already have been shipped and sold to consumers and may
never be recovered via a food recall1 . Several studies have estimated economic impacts
of meat product food safety recalls, including losses accrued by upstream and downstream
market participants (2), livestock market reactions (3), and retail meat demand impacts (4).
1 For example, in the 1998 Colorado Boxed Beef E. coli recall, of 359,000 pounds of ground beef implicated in the recall, only
one pound was ultimately recovered (1).
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attention and thus provides an appropriate food safety recall
for comparison.
Previous studies examining impacts of food safety recalls
due to E. coli have used identification strategies that leveraged
recall frequency and magnitude. In contrast, only three antibiotic
residue FSIS recalls have been issued in the last 5 years,
each with relatively small meat volumes recalled. In such
situations with infrequent occurrence and small magnitudes,
traditional identification fails because of few non-zero values
and larger variation. One alternative method, which we use
here, is to develop a hypothetical choice experiment to allow for
identification and comparison of consumer devaluations given
choice attributes. This choice experiment asked a representative
sample of U.S. consumers to make repeated choices between
three shopping scenarios. Consumers were asked to select the
shopping scenario where they would purchase ground beef.
Shopping scenario attributes included a potential food safety
recall in the previous month (E. coli or antibiotic residue), store
location (supermarket, club, and convenience), additional private
testing, and the price of ground beef. Ground beef valuations
and elasticities were derived from estimations which observed
consumer purchase decisions across multiple choice sets.
Utility maximization is the behavioral decision rule most
often used to obtain consumer valuations, and in particular,
in choice experiments involving food purchasing decisions.
This rule assumes that consumers evaluate the set of shopping
scenarios and then select the one offering the most utility
or satisfaction. Despite the popularity of utility maximization,
consumers making risky choices where they face (potentially)
short or long-term sub-optimal decisions may be subject to
regret. One recent alternative framework allows regret to be
incorporated as a behavioral decision rule—assuming consumers
aim to minimize regret (13). Incorporating regret allows the
chosen alternative to depend on the anticipated performance
of non-chosen alternatives. This behavioral variation has
received increasing attention in transportation, urban planning,
environmental economics, and health economics, and when
significant potential losses, gains, or policy implications are
involved, as is the case with food safety [e.g., (14–20)]. These
studies assessed circumstances under which random regret
minimization is a more appropriate behavioral assumption than
utility maximization. We add to this literature by comparing
the relative performance of the Random Utility Model (RUM)
and Random Regret Minimization (RRM) under risky decision
making in the context of food safety recalls.
We find that 60% of consumers in our sample are
better modeled using a regret minimizing framework as
opposed to utility maximization. This suggests, in the case of
food safety valuation, studies assuming utility maximization
might be misclassified and hence lead to incorrect policy
recommendations. Our results add to the literature examining
differences between random regret and utility maximizing
behavioral frameworks by focusing on the context of decisions
where there are potential short- and long-run negative impacts
on human health. Our work confirms previous findings that
a regret minimizing framework may be more appropriate in
circumstances where there are actual losses or gains (20). We

The magnitude of economic losses associated with food recalls
has incentivized pre- and post-harvest research, development,
and regulation to mitigate impacts. A key question that arises is:
What is the optimal amount of investment to reduce future food
safety issues? For example, to reduce the occurrence of pathogens
in meat products, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) regulations were enacted in the United States in 1996.
Antle [(5). p. 321] estimated that the annual costs of these
regulations “could range from about $500 million to $5 billion
(1995 dollars).” Knowing how much consumers devalue products
as a result of a food safety breach can help inform the value of
improving food safety. However, consumer valuations may differ
by the cause and circumstances surrounding food safety recalls.
One way to classify food safety breaches is by their probability
and potential severity to human health. Using this method of
classification, the United States Department of Agriculture’s Food
Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS), which is responsible
for inspections and recall notifications for meat, poultry, and egg
products, classifies food recalls into three broad classes. Class I
(Class II) recalls imply that the potential issue has a reasonable
(remote) probability that eating the food will cause human health
problems or death, whereas a Class III recall involves a situation
in which eating the food will not adversely affect human health.
With few exceptions, literature examining the impact of food
safety issues has focused on the more frequent and costly Class
I recalls such as E. coli, Listeria, and Salmonella. Little is known
about how consumers react to Class II recalls, which are fewer
and tend to have less immediate acute health outcomes.
This research estimates the magnitude of consumer
devaluation by food safety class Specifically, we compare
consumer valuations for ground beef given either an E. coli
(Class I) or antibiotic residue (Class II) recall, conditional
on the type of retail outlet involved in the recall. From this,
we derive consumer willingness to pay for additional private
non-government food safety testing. We then empirically test
the factors believed to influence consumer ground beef valuation
including consumer shopping behavior (6–8), household
cooking arrangement (8), organizational trust for food safety
information (9), and purchase regret when health can be
affected (10, 11).
We focus on E. coli and antibiotic residue for several
reasons. Antimicrobial residue is an FSIS Class II consumer
food safety concern that has recently received considerable
public attention. Concerns have centered around allergies
to antimicrobial residues, maximum allowable residue levels,
and perceived threats to public health through antimicrobial
resistance (12). While the number of meat products testing
positive for antibiotic residue is low2 , little is known about how
much consumers devalue meat products given an antimicrobial
residue recall. E. coli is a frequent FSIS Class I consumer food
safety concern that has received considerable research and public
2 Processed meat is subject to both random and targeted sampling for antimicrobial

residue by FSIS’s National Residue Program. While the number of samples
violating residue levels remains low (∼0.3% for livestock products) some products
inevitably pass inspection, reach the supermarket and are later recalled due to
consumer reports of adverse reactions or illnesses from product consumption.
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ensure that they are making reasonable and timely efforts to
notify and work with product distributors to remove potentially
contaminated products. When a reasonable effort has been made
to contact and retrieve potentially contaminated products, FSIS
removes the food safety issues from current monitored recalls,
and no additional testing or monitoring occurs.

show that the RRM is the statistically preferred model that
generates lower willingness-to-pay estimates and more elastic
attribute estimates. Using price as a policy mechanism implies
lower price discounts are required to maintain a given level of
market share compared to the RUM framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section food
safety detection, frequency, and impact describes the process
of potential food safety issues, frequency and type of recalls,
and previous results on the economic impacts of recalls across
food safety classes. Section data describes the data and the
hypothetical choice experiment used. Section methods presents
two simple models to frame consumer choice under two different
behavioral assumptions. Section results presents empirical results
and simulates potential industry and policy responses. Section
discussion and conclusions concludes the article.

Type and Frequency of Food Recalls
Food recalls are categorized into one of three classes by their
probability to cause human health problems or death. Class I
(Class II) implies that there is a reasonable (remote) probability
that eating the food will cause human health problems or death
whereas Class III recall involves a situation in which eating the
food will not adversely affect human health. Examples of a Class
I recall includes the presence of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli
(STECs) in raw ground beef. Class II recall examples include
the presence of very small amounts of undeclared allergens
associated with milder human reactions (e.g., wheat) or antibiotic
residue. Class III recall examples include the presence of nonallergenic products such as excess water in meat products. Thus,
recall classes can span across multiple species and processed
product formats.
The far-left chart in Figure 1 displays the number of recalls
annually by FSIS safety class. Class I recalls have sharply increased
since 2010, whereas Class II and III recalls gradually increased
until 2010 but have since leveled off. The distribution of causes for
recalls has changed through time. For example, recalls due to E.
coli contamination were the most common in 2007 but declined
year-over-year until 2013 and then stayed constant between 2013
and 2018 (middle chart, Figure 1). Allergens or foreign material
recalls were less common in 2005 but sharply increased as the
primary reason for food recalls. Although most food issues can
span across multiple species and processed product formats,
there does not appear to be any difference in frequency across
food issues within a given species (far right chart Figure 1).
The exception to this is the larger number of beef food safety
recalls between 2006 and 2010 compared to other meat and
poultry products.

FOOD SAFETY DETECTION, FREQUENCY,
AND IMPACT
Process of Food Safety Detection
The primary objective of a food safety recall is to reduce human
health hazards by removing potentially harmful, contaminated,
or mislabeled products from the market. Information about
products that have been recalled is provided by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and by USDA-FSIS. The FSIS is
responsible for inspecting and regulating meat, poultry and
processed egg products produced in Federally inspected plants.
All remaining food products are regulated by the FDA.
FSIS works to address potential meat, poultry, and egg
safety issues through a five-step process: problem identification,
preliminary investigation, recall deliberations, notifications and
actions, and recall closure. FSIS identifies potential food
safety issues through regular sampling, consumer complaints,
epidemiological or laboratory data submitted by public health
departments, company self-reporting, and other government
agencies. Based on this information, a preliminary investigation
can be conducted which includes gathering additional product
information and potentially harmed individuals. The objective
is to determine whether the alleged product caused, or has the
potential to cause, negative health outcomes. With this additional
information and analysis in hand, FSIS determines if additional
action is warranted. Potential actions include product recall,
public health alert, regulatory action, or no action. If a product
recall is issued, the recall is classified into one of three safety
classes based on relative risk to human health, and the responsible
firm is contacted with a request to voluntary recall products.
If the firm agrees to a voluntary recall of potentially harmful
products, FSIS notifies the public. The classification of the food
safety issue as a human health hazard determines the medium
by which FSIS notifies the consumers. A Recall Release is used
for Class I and Class II recalls and a Recall Notification Report
for Class III recalls. The primary difference between the Recall
Notification Report and Recall Release is that the Recall Release
is disseminated to public health partners. Regardless of recall
classification, all public releases are publicly posted. After public
notification of the food safety issue, FSIS works with firms to
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org

Impact of Food Recalls
The economic impacts of food safety recalls have been explored
extensively. Studies have examined the impact of food safety
recalls on company stock prices (21–24), retail meat and livestock
prices (2, 3, 25–27), and meat demand (4, 28–30). The impact
of recalls is known to have both short- (4) and long-run (31)
implications within the species for which the recall occurred
and spillover effects into other species. Some studies have
focused on the impact of high-volume beef recalls due to E.
coli [see Moon and Tonsor (2) for a recent example] compared
to low occurring Hepatitis A (23) or Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) (26).
Other studies have focused on how mitigating the impacts of
food safety recalls affects downstream and upstream participants.
Tonsor and Schroeder (32) examined the impacts of adoption of
an E. coli vaccine at U.S. feedlots. They concluded that feedlots
were unlikely to adopt such a vaccine unless compensated
to offset the direct costs of adoption. Moon and Tonsor (2)
examined price reactions along the beef-cattle supply chain due
3
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FIGURE 1 | Number of food safety recalls by class, reason, and species (USDA-FSIS 2020).

food safety classes (31). Such “food safety indices” do not directly
capture the impact by class heterogeneity but rather provide an
average or weighted average impact across all classes. If consumer
valuations for food safety recalls are a function of the relative
probability of illness and death, then the magnitude of impacts
should be different across classes. Thus, consumer reactions to
and valuations of Class I recalls should be larger in magnitude
than those of Class II recalls, and Class II recalls larger than Class
III recalls. Likewise, the valuation of Class III recalls should be
∼0, given that this class of recalls does not pose any probability
of human health problems or death. The relative difference in
magnitude between Class I and Class II recalls is uncertain and
likely to vary given the food safety issues compared.
It seems obvious that food safety events lower retail prices,
since there is a loss of consumer confidence (4) resulting in
lower expected utility from consumption and reduced demand.
However, no studies have attempted to compare consumer
valuations across food safety classes. This study compares one
Class I food safety recall (E. coli) and one Class II food safety
recall (antibiotic residue) in order to understand better consumer
perceptions across food safety classes.

to an official E. coli beef safety recall. Local downstream agents
were more likely to be affected financially from an official E.
coli beef safety recall compared to livestock producers. Thus,
implementation of additional risk abatement efforts by local
downstream agents, above current practices, were likely to be
financially beneficial. Tonsor et al. (9) examined how product
characteristics affected consumer perceptions of food safety
issues and how trustworthy information sources were viewed.
Consumers who placed considerable trust in product credence
attributes or in information obtained from health professionals
perceived low levels of beef safety risk. Thus, product attributes
and information sources can partially mitigate the effects of a
food safety recall.
A common thread in past studies is their focus on Class
I food safety issues (i.e., where there is a reasonable risk of
human health problems or death). This class of recalls tends to
be large in volume, more frequent, and highly publicized where
human health issues are immediately noticeable (see Figure 1
left chart)3 . Little work has focused on the impact of Class II
food safety recalls, which pose minimal risk to human health.
This class of recalls tends to be small in volume, less frequent,
and less publicized, even though the subjects of such recalls can
potentially affect the long-term health of affected individuals (see
Figure 1 left chart). Infrequent occurrence and wide variation in
volume in some Class II recalls could lead to biased estimates
using commonly used econometric identification strategies.
One way to deal with the issues of recall class heterogeneity
is to focus on building demand indices that span across multiple

DATA
Sample
The primary objective of this study was addressed by conducting
a nationwide online survey of meat-eating shoppers. The survey
was developed and pretested by 120 respondents, the majority
of whom resided in Kansas. The pretest identified potential
issues regarding survey length, questions, and responses. The
final survey was then delivered to an online panel of consumers
provided by Survey Sampling International (SSI) in the summer
of 2017. SSI maintains a list of individuals who “opt-in” to receive
and potentially participate in online surveys.

3 The frequent media links between Chipotle Mexican Grill and E. coli in 2015
caused sharp decrease in restaurant patronage reflected in stock price devaluation.
The incubation period for E. coli is usually 3–4 days after the exposure, but may be
as short as 1 day or as long as 10 days. Symptoms begin with a mild belly pain or
non-bloody diarrhea which worsens over several days.
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primarily purchased at club stores, and 5% purchased at “other”
stores5 .
Approximately 61% (40.61 + 18.15 + 2.5 = 61.26) of
individuals indicated that they cooked food themselves, 28%
cooked together with another household member, and 11%
indicated someone else was primarily responsible for cooking.
Additional combinations of cooking and shopping habits by
store format can be explored using Table A3. For example,
∼32% of respondents did all the food shopping, primarily at a
supermarket, and were responsible for all of the cooking.
Food safety information sources are known to affect consumer
food safety perceptions significantly (9). Respondents were asked
to classify 27 information sources as either “helpful,” “somewhat
helpful,” or “not helpful” for receiving food safety information.
The 27 information sources were allocated into six broad parent
groups: government, advocacy groups, producer, store, media,
and family and friends6 . Descriptive statistics are summarized
in Table A4. Government and family and friends were viewed
as the two most helpful sources of information. Food safety
information from the government (family and friends) was
considered “helpful” or “somewhat helpful” 58.4% (57.5%).
Advocacy groups and stores were viewed as the least helpful for
food safety information.

Individuals who received the survey from SSI “opted-in”
to complete the survey and respondents who subsequently
completed the survey received $4.00 (2017 dollars) from
the researchers. Individuals who did not “opt-in” to the
survey or exited prior to completion did not receive any
monetary compensation. Since our focus was on the individual’s
valuation of meat products due to a food safety issue, we
discarded respondents who did not eat meat4 . On average,
individuals took 25.8 min to complete the survey. In total, 2,696
individuals entered the survey, 2,640 agreed to the associated
survey risks, 2,065 completed the survey, of whom 1,994
respondents ate meat. Thus, 1,994 responses were obtained and
subsequently analyzed.
Demographic information from the 2010 U.S. Census (33)
were used during survey sampling to ensure that survey
respondents were representative of U.S. consumers. Table A1
compares survey respondent demographics to 2010 Census
values. Survey respondents were slightly more educated, with
a higher representation of female participants, and had slightly
less income on average. Other demographic characteristics
of the sample closely aligned with the 2010 Census. The
sample of respondents through SSI may not represent a
completely probabilistic sample of the population, which
may result in a somewhat less representative sample, given
respondents “opt-in” to take the survey. A benefit though
is that the results may be more accurate for respondents
that opted in, given their potential interest in the survey
topic (34).
The survey included questions regarding meat consumption
habits, food shopping, and cooking and meal preparation
behavior, as well as the usefulness of various organizations for
food safety information. Individuals were asked to specify how
often they eat a specific meat product using the categories of
(i) never, (ii) once a month or less, (iii) two to three times
per month, (iv) once per week, and (v) more than once a
week. Table A2 summarizes the frequency of meat consumption
by meat product. Chicken and beef were the most frequently
consumed products. Approximately 57% (45%) of respondents
ate chicken (beef) at least once a week. Fish and turkey were the
least commonly consumed meat products. Approximately 44%
(55%) of individuals ate fish (turkey) once a month or less or
not at all.
Individuals were asked what their role was in shopping, the
store format where the majority of shopping took place, and
their role in cooking. Table A3 summarizes responses to these
questions. Across all store formats, ∼59% (38.20 + 17.69 +
2.75 = 58.64) of respondents indicated that they did all the
food shopping, 26% did the majority of their food shopping,
8% divided food shopping responsibilities, and 8% did the
minority of shopping for their household. When choosing a
store to purchase food from, ∼65% of individuals indicated that
they purchased the majority of their food at supermarkets, 30%

Stated Choice Experiment
Hypothetical stated choice experiments are a subset of stated
choice experiment methods where individuals select what they
would do in a hypothetical situation but are not required to take
physical action. This methodological subsection is particularly
useful when a product or event is infrequently or not observed.
These methods have been widely applied in studies of psychology
and social behavior (35, 36), public health (37, 38), economics
(39, 40), marketing (41, 42), environmental valuation (11), and
transportation (43, 44).
A hypothetical stated choice experiment (CE) was created to
estimate shopping scenario elasticities and consumer WTP for
one pound of ground beef given a hypothetical food safety recall.
One concern when using hypothetical stated choice experiments
is “hypothetical bias,” the difference between reported/stated and
actual action. “Cheap talk” scripts ask individuals to imagine
themselves in the situation prior to making a purchase decision
and have been shown to reduce hypothetical bias (45). Thus,
a cheap talk script was included in the survey prior to stated
choice question7 . Each individual was asked to consider six
5 “Other”

stores include dollar stores, drug stores, natural + organic stores,
convenience stores, ethnic food stores, and online-only food stores.
6 Government included FSIS, FDA, CDC, and food industry scientists. Advocacy
groups included consumer organizations and environmental groups. Producers
included food manufactures, farmers/growers, and local butcher. Stores included
my primary food store, fine dining restaurant, casual dining restaurant, and
fast food restaurant. Media included TV, radio, newspapers, food magazines,
food and cooking channels, social media, blogs, internet website, and
entertainment industry. Family and Friends included friends, family, doctors, and
health/dietary/life coach.
7 The cheap talk stated the following “Imagine you are thinking about going to a
store to buy ground beef. Each store will have the following: a specific format (e.g.,
supermarket or club store) whether a food safety issue has ever occurred in the
store (E. coli or antibiotic residue) whether additional private ground beef safety

4 People who self-identified as not eating meat completed the survey is significantly
less times (18.5 min) than those who self-identified as meat eaters (25.8 min). This
provides some evidence that individuals who did not eat meat products were less
engaged in the survey, thus potentially downward biasing the results.
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FIGURE 2 | Hypothetical consumer choice scenario example.

in meat products. The “no food safety issue” was included to
provide a control scenario.
Three store formats were used: supermarket, club, and
convenience. About 81 percent of U.S. households purchase
much of their food from these types of stores8 (46). Among
our respondents, ∼95% indicated that they purchased food from
these types of stores. In the event of a food safety recall, processors
work with retail stores to secure the return of potentially harmful
products from consumers. When a reasonable effort has been
made to contact and retrieve potentially contaminated products,
FSIS removes the food safety issue in question from current
monitored recalls. No additional testing occurs to ensure that
any remaining products are safe to consume. Since no further
testing occurs, above the systematic and random sampling for
new products shipped to stores, private stores could engage in
additional testing to assure customers that food safety issues have
been resolved. Thus, regardless of store format, we allow stores
to engage in additional/on-site private testing as a measure of
consumer quality assurance9 .
The length of time a food safety recall remains “current/active”
varies. The objective of the study is to measure how much
consumers discount ground beef after a food safety recall has

independent choice sets in which they selected between two
shopping scenarios (Shopping A, Shopping B) and a “do not
shop” option resulting in three different choice options per choice
set (see Figure 2 for an example of one of the choice sets used).
Shopping scenario attributes were selected by consulting food
safety scientists and a focus group session with U.S. shoppers.
The final shopping scenario attributes and attribute levels used
are provided in Table 1.
Five different prices were used in the choice design. A base
ground beef price was established using prices provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The
average price of ground beef was $2.25 per pound. Using this as
a midpoint, we specified four additional hypothetical prices by
adding and subtracting $0.15 and $0.75. Thus, there were five
different prices with a spread of $1.50 per pound.
One Class I recall and one Class II recall were selected from a
list of potential food safety recalls. E. coli, antibiotic residue, and
“no food safety issue” were the three food safety issues (attribute
levels) selected. E. coli, a Class I recall, was selected given the
considerable amount of food safety research already conducted
and the large investments made by the beef industry and
government individuals to improve pre- and post-harvest E. coli
food safety. Antibiotic residue, a Class II recall, was selected since
antimicrobial residue and resistance is a rising concern among
consumers. Current beef research is attempting to discover preand post-harvest ways to reduce potential antimicrobial residue

8 We acknowledge that this potentially biases the results, as some consumers
primarily purchase food at dollar, drug, organic/natural, convenience, ethnic, or
online stores. However, ∼95% of individuals who completed the survey indicated
that supermarkets, club stores, and convenience stores were considered their
primary source of grocery-type items. This is representative of the average U.S.
consumer population.
9 We recognize that not every store format may be able to conduct private testing.
Reasons vary from logistic to cost-effectiveness. We do not attempt to answer if it
is feasible for certain store formats to engage in testing and at what price premium
this becomes cost-effective.

testing is conducted and the price for ground beef ($/lb). You will be shown two
different stores and asked which one you would shop at, if any. Please answer as
honestly as possible and in a manner that you think would reflect your true shopping
attitude.”
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TABLE 1 | Contract attributes and levels for stated choice experiments given a hypothetical food safety recall.
Contract attribute

Description

Levels
Level names

Number of levels

Product

Meat product available for individuals to purchase

Ground beef (1 lb.)

1

Time since last food safety
issue

Indicates the time since the initial notification from USDA-FSIS to the
public about a food safety issue

4 weeks

1

Food safety issue

Indicates the type of food safety issue that has USDA-FSIS has notified
the public about, if any

None, E. coli, antibiotic residue

3

Private testing

“Yes” indicates the store will provide additional testing to ensure the food
safety recall is contained, and “No” otherwise

Yes, no

2

Store format

Indicates the store individuals can purchase their ground beef from

Supermarket, club,
convenience

3

Price

Advertised price ($/lb.) for ground beef

$1.50, $2.10, $2.25, $2.40,
$3.00

5

(choice scenario) asking respondent to choose between three
shopping scenarios: “Shopping A,” “Shopping B,” and “Do Not
Shop” (an “opt out” option). Each shopping scenario contained
attribute information about shopping scenario prices, food safety
issues, and level of private testing. Given the large number of
choice scenarios, the choice scenarios were blocked into 20 sets
of 6 scenarios (or questions). Blocking was done using PROC
OPTEX in SAS. Individuals who agreed to participate in the
survey were randomly assigned to one of the blocks of six
questions (or choice scenarios) followed by questions concerning
their consumption and cooking habits, as well as access and
preference for food safety information. Prior to answering the set
of choice questions, participants were presented with a cheap talk
script. The six choice questions (sets) were randomly ordered to
avoid any potential order bias. After completing the stated choice
experiment and subsequent questions, participants were asked
some follow-up demographic questions, after which they then
exited the survey.

occurred, but after the initial potential threat to human health
has decreased, preferably to zero. It is difficult to determine when
the minimal potential threat to human health approximates to
zero. A food safety recall may be “current/active” for several
months or years, but it is unlikely that the threat to human
health remains constant through time. One way to proxy whether
the potential threat to human health approximates to zero
is through an epidemiological outbreak curve which tracks
reported health occurrences through time. Using epidemiological
outbreak curves from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) for E. coli-O157, a time frame of 1 month
was selected10 . Thus, given that a food safety issue potentially
happened in the prior month and no immediate health threat is
likely present to consumers, the potential discount to ground beef
can be viewed as an “intermediate-term” impact.
Given one meat product, one time period, three hypothetical
food safety issues, two levels of private testing, three store
formats, and five prices, there are
 8,100 different possible choice
sets (1 × 1 × 3 × 2 × 3 × 5)2 that could be constructed. Thus,
we opted to use an orthogonal balanced incomplete (fractional)
block design to capture the main and first-order interaction
effects. This design is superior to other commonly used designs
since it tends to be more reliable, maintains adequate flexibility,
accurately captures extreme options, and reduces the burden of
excessive questions on respondents (47). PROC OPTEX in SAS
was used to develop the incomplete block fractional factorial
design, providing 120 random choice sets, which were then
grouped into 20 blocks, with each block containing six choice sets
that could be used to identify main and interaction effects. The
D-efficiency criterion (89.72%) was used to assess the optimal
block design efficiency. Each choice set represents a question
that a respondent may face in the survey, with each question

METHODS
Random Utility Maximization Model
The Random Utility Maximization framework (RUM) assumes
individuals are utility maximizers, where utility is derived from
the attributes of the product or good being consumed (48). Given
that the researcher only observes the choice of the consumer, it
is assumed that the individual’s utility function is represented as
Unit = β ′ Xnit + εnit , where X is a vector of attributes observed for
individual n (1, . . . , N) when choosing alternative i (1, . . . , I) in
choice set t (1, . . . , T), β is a vector of parameters to be estimated,
and ε is the unobserved part of utility. Given that ε is unobserved,
we treat ε as a random variable. Following Train (49), we assume
ε is distributed Extreme Value Type I. Train (49) explains that this
distributional assumption does not differ substantially from the
normal distribution, but does allow for more aberrant behavior
given it has fatter tails. In addition, this distributional assumption
allows for a closed-from solution for the choice probabilities of
interest in this study. The probability of an individual choosing
alternative i over alternative j in choice set t is given by the

10 After initial confirmation of a food safety outbreak, the CDC continues to
monitor situation for about one month. CDC stops monitoring most food safety
issues after one month since most of the harmful product has either been recalled
or diminishing safety incidences. This does not imply that there are no more food
safety issues but rather that they are not actively monitoring the situation anymore.
Thus, 1 month is a broad way of defining the length of time to resolve food safety
issues.
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Random Utility Multinomial Logit (RUM-MNL) function:
exp(Vnit )


′
j=1 exp Vnjt

Pnit = P
J

important determinant in choice behavior (55–58). Regret is
particularly present when making risky choices where individuals
must absorb (potentially) short or long-term sub-optimal
decisions. Likewise, there is evidence that modeling regret,
compared to utility maximization, is more appropriate when
there are significant potential losses or gains involved (20).
The forgoing discussion about model estimation in this
context can now be modified to show how the Random
Regret Minimization model differs from the commonly accepted
assumption of Random Utility Maximization. The RUM aims to
capture the marginal (dis)utility attached to alternative-specific
attributes. The RRM assumes individuals minimize the sum of
binary regrets between alternatives. Thus, for a given alternative
i, regret occurs when it is outperformed by alternative j on
attribute m. Letting there be m (1, . . . , M) attributes, regret can
be modeled as:

(1)

where Vnit = β ′ Xnit .
The RUM-MNL assumes that all individuals have similar
views on food safety recall attributes. It is likely that these
views vary across individuals and that groups of individuals
have similar tastes and preferences. We allow for this type
of heterogeneity using a latent class model in which attribute
estimates are assumed to be similar within groups/classes but
different across groups/classes. The approach and number of
classes to include was determined using a combination of the
Akaike information criterion [AIC; (50)], adjusted Bayesian
information criterion [BIC; (51)], and relevant class sizes
consisting of at least 20% of the individuals (52, 53). Thus, we
modify Equation 1 to allow estimation of classes, C, given as:
Pnit =

XC

c=1

Pnc P

exp(Vnit )


′
Vnjt

J
j=1 exp

RRi = Ri + ǫi
X XM
=
j6=i

(2)



ln 1 + exp δm × xjm − xim
+ ǫi (3)

where RRi is the total regret associated with alternative i, Ri
is the observed regret associated with alternative i, ǫi is the
unobserved regret associated with alternative i, δm is an estimated
parameter associated with attribute xm , and xim and xjm are values
associated with xm for considered alternative i and alternative j.
Regret for alternative i approaches zero with respect to attribute
m when the difference between xjm and xim is at least <0. The
Logsum formulation of attribute-level regret in Equation 3 acts
to smooth the regret-function and allows for an approximation
that is differentiable and globally concave (59).
Similar to the RUM framework, different models arise given
different distributional assumptions for ǫi . If the negative of the
errors (ǫi ) is distributed as Extreme Value Type I, the choice
probabilities gives rise to the Random Regret Minimization
Multinomial Logit (RRM-MNL) model, where the choice
probability can be written as:

where Pnc is the probability of individual n being in class c,
Vnit is the same as described above expect now the parameters
are class specific (i.e., βc ). Pnc is assumed to be a function of
individual-specific characteristics that describe the characteristics
exp(γc′ Zn )
of the group. That is: Pnc = PR
, where γc is a vector of
′
r=1 exp(γr Zn )
class parameters to be estimated and Zn is a vector of individual
specific covariates. We assume class membership is determined
by trust in informational sources, buying behavior, and cooking
behavior (6–8).

Random Regret Minimization Model
Nearly all hypothetical choice experiments have been based
on the behavioral assumption of utility maximization. Decision
rules within this framework aim to model the marginal
(dis)utility attached to alternative-specific attributes. Despite
the popularity of the utility maximization framework, various
attempts have been made to relax its underlying premises which
at times lack behavioral realism. One alternative framework,
the Random Regret Minimization (RRM), allows a chosen
alternative to depend on the anticipated performance of nonchosen alternatives. This behavioral variation in the decision
rule implies that the selection of a specific alternative is
affected by the relative (non)performance of one or more
non-chosen alternatives. If one or more of the alternatives
perform better than the chosen alternative, then this choice
would cause an individual “regret.” Thus, the behavioral
assumption assumes that an individual seeks to minimize
anticipated regret rather than maximize utility from a given
choice (54).
Empirical evidence supports this behavioral modification
of regret compared to utility maximization. For example,
microeconomics and psychology both find that regret is an
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m=1

exp(−Rnit )


Pnit = P
J
′
j=1 exp Rnjt

(4)

where Rnit is the random regret for individual n choosing
alternative i in choice set t. It is important to note that
Equation 4 is maximizing the negative of random regret, which
is mathematically equivalent to the minimization of random
regret (20).
We believe that the behavioral assumption of the model
should not alter the presence of individual preference
heterogeneity. Likewise, we believe that these taste preferences
are still different across but similar within groups of consumers.
The decision rule to identify classes/groups of individuals is the
same as the rule used under the RUM-MNL framework. The
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is restricted to zero known as the “random response share”
[RRS; (65)].
We determined where there are inattentive respondents in
our survey by estimating Equations 1 and 4 and then statistically
testing model fit against Equations 2 and 5 with two classes where
one class is restricted to zero (65). All models were estimated
in NLOGIT6. Latent class models under both behavioral
frameworks identified 31% of respondents as producing random
responses highlighting the importance of accounting for this
class of individuals. A log likelihood test determined that by
accounting for identified non-attentive individuals, model fit
significantly improved. Thus, all models reported in subsequent
tables were estimated using a latent class model where one class
was restricted to zero to capture RRS.

latent class model is derived by modifying Equation 4 as follows:

Pnit =

C
X
c=1

PRnc P

exp(−Rnit )


R′njt

J
j=1 exp

(5)

where PRnc is the probability of individual n being in class
c, Rnit is the same as described above expect now with classspecific parameters. The specification of PRnc follows that of the
RUM-MNL model presented in the previous subsection.

Hybrid Model: Random Utility Plus Random
Regret
It is unlikely that every individual or group of individuals views
choice decisions under a regret minimizing or utility maximizing
framework. Some individuals may aim to maximize utility
while others may minimize regret. In our context of making
decisions about potential ground beef decisions after a potential
food safety issue some combination of utility maximization
and regret minimization seems particularly important. Previous
research suggests that there is significant variation in how
individuals view the cost or likelihood of a food risk occurring
(60). Proper categorization of individuals is important since
managerial and policy decisions are likely to differ substantially
between these groups. Whether groups of individuals exist, the
relative size of said groups, and the differences in managerial
and policy implications arising from these two groups can be
empirically tested.
We test this hypothesis by using a latent class model where
some classes/groups are constrained to be utility maximizing and
others regret minimizing. This hybrid model specifies that some
choice probabilities follow Equation 2 under the random utility
framework while other choice probabilities follow Equation 5
under the random regret minimization framework. Hess and
Stathopoulos (61) describe in detail how this type of model is
specified and estimated using the framework provided for the
random utility and random regret models. The optimal number
of classes under each behavioral framework is determined
using the latent class decision rule described for the other
models previously discussed. We more deeply explore which
socioeconomic covariates characterizing individual n are likely to
be related to risk-minimizing or utility-maximizing behavior for
food safety recalls using this hybrid framework.

RESULTS
Multinomial Logit Estimation Under Both
Behavioral Frameworks
Table 2 presents estimates under two different behavioral
assumptions: random utility maximization (RUM) and random
regret minimization (RRM)11 . The McFadden Pseudo R2 values
indicates a relatively decent fit to the data. Although the AIC
and log likelihood values appear similar, suggesting statistically
similarity between models, the traditional log likelihood tests
can only be used to compare statistical differences between
nested models. Since the RUM and RRM models are non-nested,
traditional log-likelihood tests are inappropriate. The Vuong
test (66) is one non-nested testing procedure that is applicable
when there are two or more choice alternatives and the models
may be observationally equivalent. The null hypothesis for the
Vuong test is that the two behavioral frameworks are equally
“close” or are representative of the true data generating process.
The alternative hypothesis is that only one of the behavioral
frameworks is closer or more representative of the true data
generating process. However, the test cannot determine if the
“closer” framework is the true data generating process. A Vuong
statistic <-2 favors the alternative hypothesis, a value > +2
favors the null hypothesis, and a value between −2 and +2
is inconclusive. Using model information from Table 2, we
calculate the Vuong test statistic. The test statistic is −4.12
implying that that the RRM (alternative model) is closer to the
true data generating process than the RUM. Thus, the RRM is
preferred in comparison to the RUM.
All parameters in Table 2 have the expected sign and are
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While the models are
statistically similar to each other and coefficient signs are all the
same, the direct comparison of magnitudes of the coefficients
across behavioral frameworks is not meaningful (67). Where
RUM parameters signify the contribution of an attribute to
an alternative’s utility, RRM parameters signify the potential

Data Quality Checks and Methods of
Comparison
Survey length and monetary compensation for survey
completion were a potential concern for response quality,
and thereby estimation (62, 63). Researchers traditionally
overcome these issues by asking engagement or inattention
questions randomly throughout the survey. Individuals who fail
inattention questions are generally removed prior to estimation
since they pose a significant threat to data quality and can
lead to significant violations to axioms of revealed preferences
(63, 64). Recent research suggests that inattentive individuals
can be captured through a latent class model where one class
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estimations converged with set convergence criteria (1e-6) based on
the gradient using starting values from the corresponding standard multinomial
model in NLOGIT. We ran several robustness checks changing tolerance criteria
algorithmic parameters, and found that both coefficient estimates and class size
were robust to these changes.
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TABLE 2 | Latent class model estimation with random response share under alternative behavioral assumptions.
Random utility maximization (RUM)
Mean
Constant
Price

SE

Random regret minimization (RRM)

WTP ($/lb.)

Mean

SE

0.587**

0.069

0.933**

0.137

−0.354**

0.032

−0.521**

0.053

WTP ($/lb.)

E. coli

−2.939**

0.101

−8.30

−4.393**

0.123

−6.31

Residue

−1.736**

0.045

−4.90

−2.816**

0.072

−3.77

Club store

0.732**

0.049

2.07

1.213**

0.073

2.60

Supermarket

1.069**

0.049

3.02

1.706**

0.072

3.87

Private testing

0.506**

0.036

1.43

0.801**

0.054

1.66

RRS
McFadden R2

0.307**

0.309**

0.235

0.233

−10,045

−10,072

AIC

20,106

20,161

N

11,9641

11,964

LL

**indicates significance at the 0.01 level.

individuals viewed both store formats as more viable locations
to purchase ground beef when compared to convenience stores.
If stores were to adopt private food safety testing, the odds of
purchasing ground beef would increase by ∼65–120% depending
on the behavioral framework.
The differences in odd ratios between behavioral frameworks
has potential important managerial and policy implications
targeted at reducing food safety issues across different health
classifications. Compared to the RUM framework, the RRM
estimates suggest that individuals view E. coli as being more
harmful than antibiotic residue. In addition, individuals have
greater odds of purchasing ground beef if there were private
store testing. Policies based on estimates from RRM would imply
conducting less research and development for pre- and postharvest practices to reduce antibiotic residue in meat products
and a greater need for private store testing.

contribution of an attribute to the regret associated with an
alternative conditional on non-chosen alternatives (20). Even
though the magnitude of coefficients between the RUM and RRM
frameworks cannot be directly compared, the relative odd ratios
between parameters within the same framework is meaningful.
Thus, we calculate the odd ratios between parameter estimates.
Under both frameworks, the likelihood of purchasing ground
beef given an E. coli (Class I) recall is greater (i.e., more negative)
than a food recall due to antibiotic residue (Class II). Both food
recall estimates are negative indicating the odds of purchasing
ground beef given either food safety recall decreases when either
food safety issue is present. Respondents have lower odds to
purchase ground beef given an E. coli recall relative to antibiotic
residue in the past month. The odds of purchasing ground beef
after an antibiotic residue recall compared to E. coli is 0.21–
0.30, suggesting that respondents viewed E. coli as a greater
threat to their health and therefore avoided purchases with
greater frequency. We observe larger odds ratios under the RRM
framework, suggesting that under risky food decisions, regret
may be a statistically more important behavioral component
than marginal utility. This supports the idea from Ajewole et al.
(60) that individuals view food safety risks having an immediate
impact on human health as more problematic than those with
delayed impacts. Likewise, these results support our previous
hypothesis that consumer valuations for food safety recalls are
an increasing function of the relative probability of human illness
and death. Thus, consumer reactions/valuations to Class I recalls
(i.e., E. coli) should be larger in magnitude than Class II recalls
(i.e., antibiotic residue).
The odds of purchasing ground beef at a supermarket is ∼40–
63% greater than purchasing it at a club store (e1.069 /e0.732 =
1.40). Under the RRM framework, individuals have greater odds
of purchasing ground beef at supermarkets. This result confirms
the findings from Stern et al. (46), that in 2012, individuals
purchased more food from supermarkets than from club stores.
Club Store and Supermarket estimates are positive, indicating that
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Elasticities and Willingness-To-Pay
Estimates
Direct interpretation of estimated coefficients from the
behavioral frameworks in Table 2 is not straightforward.
One alternative is to calculate and compare direct choice
elasticities. Elasticities allow comparison across attributes within
a behavioral framework, but interpretations of elasticities within
a given framework may differ. Under the RUM framework,
elasticities depend only on the performance or choice probability
of the specific alternative. However, given the behavioral premise
of the RRM framework that regret for a given alternative is
based on the relative performance of non-chosen alternatives,
interpretation of elasticities is slightly different. Namely, changes
in the alternative attribute depend on the relative performance of
all the alternatives in the choice task being assessed.
Our experimental design was an unlabeled choice in which
individuals selected between shopping experiences. Calculating
an elasticity for each store would not yield additional information
since there is no intrinsic value in the elasticity differences
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TABLE 3 | Direct elasticities and relative differences for latent class model with random response share.
Attribute

Random utility maximization (RUM)
St1

St2

St1-St2

Random regret minimization (RRM)
St1

St2

St1-St2

Elasticity ratio abs(RUM)/abs(RRM)
St1-St2

Price

−0.340**

−0.340**

0.000

−2.140**

−2.017**

−0.123

0.001

E. coli

−0.305**

−0.303**

−0.002

−4.320**

−4.381**

0.061

0.026

Residue

−0.349**

−0.355**

0.006

−1.516**

−1.260**

−0.256

0.025

0.118**

0.133**

−0.015

0.584**

0.573**

0.011

1.343

Club store
Supermarket

0.172**

0.173**

−0.001

0.766**

0.723**

0.043

0.021

Private testing

0.111**

0.120**

−0.009

0.554**

0.568**

−0.014

0.615

**indicates significance at the 0.01 level.

where t represents any non-cost attribute and c is the cost
attribute. Thus, the WTP is the ratio of attribute coefficients.
The behavioral assumptions under the RRM framework imply a
different WTP formulation. Using Equation 3, where all the noncost and cost alternatives enter the regret function, Chorus (67)
shows that the WTP can be estimated as:
(
)
P
1

between “Shopping A” and “Shopping B” for a given attribute.
Thus, following Thiene et al. (15), we calculate and report the
mean difference between “Shopping A” and “Shopping B.” Due
to these differences in the interpretation of elasticities between
frameworks, it is more appropriate to calculate an elasticity ratio.
We calculate this as the ratio between the absolute value of the
mean difference of the RUM framework divided by the absolute
value of the mean difference of the RRM framework. A ratio >1
indicates an attribute is more elastic under the RUM framework.
As the ratio approaches zero, it implies that the RRM elasticity is
more elastic.
Table 3 reports the direct elasticities for shopping scenarios
A and B, the difference between these scenarios, and the
elasticity ratio. All elasticities in both frameworks are significant
at the 0.05 level, all attributes have the expected signs, and
attributes are relatively small. Five of the six attributes become
more elastic under the RRM framework than in the RUM
framework. Most attributes were significantly more elastic under
the RRM framework compared to the RUM framework. The only
noticeable difference is that of Private Testing which tended to be
more elastic under the RUM framework.
Under both frameworks, choices made in Supermarkets are
more elastic than those made in Club Stores. This result may arise
from consumers who shop at supermarkets, buy small amounts
of select items. Thus, these consumers are likely to be more
price sensitive, whereas club store consumers generally buy bulk
amounts of products. Under the RUM framework, Residue (Class
II) is more elastic than E. coli (Class I), but the opposite is true
under the RRM framework. This shows that using an appropriate
behavioral framework is important in determining consumer
attitudes toward food safety.
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is another method to examine and
compare alternatives. WTP calculations are conditional on the
behavioral framework used and have been frequently used to
determine valuation of environmental amenities [e.g., (68)], food
attributes [e.g., (69)], and reductions in risk [e.g., (70)]. Under
the RUM framework in Equation 1 where all the non-cost and
cost attributes enter the utility function, WTP estimates can be
estimated as:

WTPRUM = −

βt
βc
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j6=i

WTPRRM = −

βt
βc P

j6=i

1+ exp[β

(

1
t (xji −xit )]

1

1+ exp[β

1
c (xjc −xic )]

)

(7)

where j, i are attributes, t is the non-cost alternative, and c is
the cost attribute. Here, it is relatively straightforward to see
how the WTPRRM is a weighted version of the WTPRUM , where
weights are determined by the relative performance of nonchosen alternatives.
WTP estimates ($/lb.) are reported in Table 2 for the RUM
and RRM frameworks. Under the RUM framework, individuals
were willing to pay an additional $1.43 per lb. of ground beef if a
store engaged in additional food safety testing. Consumers were
willing to pay approximately a dollar more to purchase ground
beef in Supermarkets compared to club stores. Consumers
discounted ground beef by ∼$8 ($5) per pound if an E. coli
(antibiotic residue) recall occurred in the prior month. Given that
the discount was larger than the average price of ground beef,
this result implies that even though consumers may be willing to
shop they would not likely purchase ground beef after these types
of events.
The RRM estimates of WTP are much different from RUM
estimates. The discount from an E. coli recall on ground beef
was ∼$6 per pound, compared with $4 per pound for an
antibiotic residue recall. These estimates are approximately $2
and $1 lower than corresponding estimates under the RUM
framework, respectively. Differing WTP estimates were found
for other attributes as well. The lower WTP estimates using
the RRM framework may indicate a “regret adjusted” WTP,
whereas WTP under RUM encompass a “risk/regret” premium.
That is, risk-averse consumers may prefer to minimize risk
(regret) rather than maximize utility in situations dealing with
potentially hazardous food risks. The differences found between

(6)
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the behavioral frameworks emphasizes the need to identify
correctly individuals purchasing behavior intentions in order to
make viable managerial and policy decisions.

1.87 and 1.37 for individuals identified in class two and class one
respectively—or about 36% smaller. Similar comparisons can be
made for the RRM and RUM+RRM frameworks.
Club Store and Supermarket both have positive coefficients,
indicating that consumers view these store formats as viable
locations to purchase ground beef. However, the larger coefficient
on Supermarket compared to Club Store across all behavioral
frameworks and classes of individuals suggests that the odds of
purchasing ground beef are greater at a supermarket than at a
club store. The coefficient for Private Testing is likewise positive,
indicating that if stores were to engage in private testing of meat
products, the odds of consumers purchasing ground beef from
any store format would increase.

Comparison of Latent Class Models and a
Combined Framework
Table 4 displays the results for the latent class models estimated
under the RUM, RRM, and RUM+RRM frameworks. Three
optimal groups of individuals were identified under each
framework using the decision rule to identify major classes based
on AIC and BIC: two RUM groups under RUM framework,
two RRM groups under RRM framework, and one RUM + one
RRM group under the hybrid framework. Our previous results
suggest that correctly identifying and categorizing individuals as
either RUM or RRM. We now attempt to differentiate between
consumer behavior related to risky choice-making based on
respondent personal characteristics. As such, a combination of
organizational trust, shopping habits, and cooking arrangements
were used to attempt to understand the sociodemographic
makeup of each class. These factors were selected based on strong
predictors of food purchase decisions identified by prior studies
of food safety and marketing [e.g., (71–74)].
Approximately 8% of individuals were identified as producing
random responses across all models. This suggests regardless
of the underlying behavioral framework, the random response
method (65) was able to identify a similar magnitude of
individuals who were inattentive. The McFadden Pseudo R2
indicates a relatively good fit to the data for each of the models.
We compared model fit across frameworks using the Vuong
test. We calculated the Vuong test statistic for each binary
comparison. In total, we have three test statistics, RUM vs. RRM,
RUM vs. RUM+RRM, and RRM vs. RUM+RRM. We find RUM
was inferior to either RRM or RUM + RRM but both RRM and
RUM+RRM models have similar statistical fit (−4.12, −3.22, and
1.70, respectively). This suggests that the behavioral assumptions
have an impact upon model performance.
Estimated coefficients from choice attributes across all the
frameworks are significant at the 0.05 level and have the expected
signs. A negative price sign indicates that as price goes up
the odds of purchasing ground beef decreases consistent with
economic theory. Negative coefficients on E. coli and Residue
are likewise consistent with economic and food safety theory,
indicating that when a food safety recall occurs, the odds that
a consumer purchased ground beef decreased. One question
specific to this paper is the relative magnitude of an E. coli
(Class I) recall compared to an antibiotic residue (Class II) recall.
Table 4 suggests that the odds of purchasing ground beef after
an E. coli recall were lower than after an antibiotic residue recall
across all frameworks and groups of individuals.
As previously mentioned, the relative magnitude of
coefficients across behavioral frameworks cannot be compared,
but the relative magnitude of coefficients across models can
(75). Under each behavioral framework, there is one class/group
of consumers which is relatively less likely to purchase ground
beef in the event of an E. coli recall. For example, under the
RUM framework, the coefficient ratio of E. coli to Residue is
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Class Specific Sociodemographic
Attributes
The individual characteristics making up each consumer class
(or segment) indicate that across behavioral frameworks, specific
types of trust play an important role in ground beef purchases.
Trust in each class is measured as the difference between the
number of sources consumers found to be very helpful vs. not
helpful. Our hypothesis is that as trust increases, so, too, will
some individuals’ odds to purchase ground beef. Across all classes
of individuals and behavioral frameworks, as governmental
trust increased, so, too, did the odds of buying ground beef.
These results support the conjecture that if consumers trust the
government, or specifically in the case of recall information from
FSIS, then the odds of purchasing ground beef after a food recall
in the previous month would increase. This likely indicates that
trust from other non-USDA governmental branches can have
trust “spillover” effects on ground beef purchasing.
Trust in advocacy groups never increased ground beef
consumption, but for select groups of consumers, the odds
of purchasing ground beef decreased. This decrease in odds
of purchasing ground beef is likely due to advocacy groups
being generally oriented toward exposing or promoting negative
information about ground beef consumption. Surprisingly, as
trust increased in stores, the odds of purchasing ground beef
decreased. There appears to be two conflicting results. First,
Table A4 suggests that a large majority of individuals do not view
stores as a helpful source of food safety information. Second,
Table 2 suggests that consumers are willing to pay a premium for
ground beef if stores engaged in private testing. We are unsure of
why store trust would decrease ground beef purchasing, but we
do note that the relative magnitude of Private Testing is larger for
classes of individuals where store trust is low. Trust in Producers,
Media, and Family all have no statistical impact on identifying
class membership based on ground beef purchasing behavior.
Thus, the increasing presence of producer promotion programs
may do little to increase the odds of purchasing ground beef given
a food safety recall.
Food purchasing and cooking behavior were also examined
as potential individual attributes which could explain class
identification. These two groups of characteristics have been
used in studies to help explain food purchase decisions (76). We
find that the self-identified proportion of groceries purchased by
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TABLE 4 | Latent class estimation with random response share under alternative specifications.
Random utility maximization (RUM)
Class 1
Mean

Class 2
SE

Mean

Random regret minimization (RRM)
Class 1

SE

Mean

Class 2
SE

Mean

SE

Hybrid model (RUM + RRM)
Class 1—RUM

Class 2—RRM

Mean

Mean

SE

SE

Choice Attributes
Constant
Price

0.601*

0.149

2.465*

0.191

0.413*

0.079

1.315*

0.097

2.250*

0.187

0.423*

0.081

−0.498*

0.060

−0.311*

0.064

−0.349*

0.037

−0.198*

0.038

−0.324*

0.064

−0.360*

0.038

E. coli

−4.281*

0.130

−1.650**

0.135

−2.886*

0.116

−1.024*

0.080

−1.833*

0.140

−2.947*

0.125

Residue

−3.117*

0.092

−0.882*

0.102

−1.970*

0.064

−0.567*

0.063

−1.011*

0.107

−2.032*

0.067

Club store

1.079*

0.079

0.720*

0.087

0.636*

0.053

0.530*

0.065

0.835*

0.090

0.628*

0.055

Supermarket

1.675*

0.076

0.836*

0.085

1.049*

0.053

0.628*

0.064

0.962*

0.089

1.059*

0.054

Private testing

0.708*

0.059

0.619*

0.066

0.447*

0.039

0.440*

0.048

0.676*

0.068

0.447*

0.040

Class Attributes
Constant

1.825*

0.656

0.835

0.733

1.694*

0.587

0.711

0.675

0.607

0.657

1.591*

0.568

Trust—government

0.257*

0.064

0.199*

0.071

0.257*

0.064

0.204*

0.071

0.212*

0.067

0.257*

0.060

Trust—advocacy

−0.488

0.256

−0.625**

0.280

−0.435

0.243

−0.584**

0.268

−0.526**

0.253

−0.381

0.228

Trust—producer

−0.047

0.118

0.075

0.128

−0.075

0.112

0.043

0.124

0.028

0.118

−0.088

0.106

Trust—store

−0.230**

0.096

−0.151

0.105

−0.244*

0.093

−0.165

0.103

−0.194**

0.096

−0.258*

0.087

Trust—media

−0.003

0.045

0.050

0.049

−0.013

0.043

0.039

0.047

0.031

0.044

−0.0186

0.040

Trust—family

0.123

0.090

0.108

0.100

0.114

0.088

0.104

0.099

0.118

0.094

0.119

0.082

Buy—all

−0.368

0.624

−0.259

0.680

−0.284

0.556

−0.210

0.616

−0.282

0.601

−0.333

0.541

Buy—majority

−0.528

0.636

−0.434

0.696

−0.440

0.566

−0.334

0.632

−0.342

0.613

−0.462

0.548

Buy—equal

−0.696

0.719

−0.532

0.796

−0.718

0.642

−0.534

0.730

−0.505

0.711

−0.729

0.624

0.269

0.431

0.771

0.498

0.226

0.424

0.788

0.496

0.838

0.470

0.230

0.399

Cook—we

0.776

0.453

1.029**

0.517

0.683

0.427

0.968

0.498

1.034**

0.476

0.697

0.406

Class Probability

0.627*

0.015

0.296*

0.015

0.617*

0.016

0.302*

0.015

0.310*

0.015

0.603*

0.016

Cook—I

Model Performance
RRS

0.076*

0.080*

McFadden R2

0.285

0.282

0.282

−9,391

−9,436

−9,429

LL

0.085*

AIC

18,859

18,949

18,935

N

11,964

11,964

11,964

*, **indicates significance at 0.05 and 0.01 level respective.

consumers has little impact on the odds of purchasing ground
beef. One plausible explanation for this is that home meal menus
are jointly created and thus ground beef is on the shopping
list regardless of who purchases the food. Evidence for this
hypothesis should appear in the household cooking arrangement.
If menus are jointly created, then cooking jointly should
be significant. We find that only the Cook-We arrangement
significantly increased the odds of ground beef purchases, but
only for a select subset of individuals—generally, the class with
a smaller class probability. Thus, this hypothesis holds but is not
true across all consumers. Other cooking did not significantly
explain class/group membership.

an E. coli (Class I) or antibiotic residue (Class II) as similar,
preferring to purchase ground beef at supermarkets and trusting
government sources, while distrusting stores. This group consists
of 63% of respondents. This group is seen in the RUMclass1, RRM-class2, and RUM+RRM-class2 classes. The second
group consisted of consumers who view E. coli as a more
problematic food safety issue than antibiotic residue, trusted
government, distrusted advocacy groups, and where cooking was
shared among household adults. This group consists of 30%
of respondents. This group is seen in the classes RUM-class2,
RRM-class2, and RUM+RRM-class1.
Results up to this point show overwhelming support for the
need to correctly identify individuals who are either utilitymaximizing or regret-minimizing. Columns 10–13 of Table 4
display the estimates for the RUM+RRM model, where one class
is restricted to RUM and the other is RRM [e.g., (61)]. The first
class, categorized as RUM, consisted of 31% of the population.
The second class, categorized as RRM, consisted of 60% of

Classes Across Behavioral Frameworks
Comparing the attributes that make up each class within
and across behavioral frameworks reveals persistent consumer
behavior. Generally, there are two broad groups of consumers
across all frameworks. The first group is identified as viewing
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Table 5, panel (a), reports these findings across the three
different behavioral models estimated in the paper (RUM, RRM
and RUM+RRM). Column one is the different price discounts
and discount scenarios. Columns two, four, and six [labeled
“Change in choice probability (%)”] are the average changes in
choice probabilities for the three behavioral models for each
respective shopping scenario. Columns three, five, and seven
[labeled “Total change (%)] report the percentage share of the
increase/decrease in choice probabilities; in other words, how
much of the change in choice probabilities is attributed to either
Non-discounted or No purchase individuals changing purchase
behavior?
Comparing changes in choice probabilities across behavioral
models reveals several insights. First, all the signs on the
coefficients are as hypothesized—a decrease in the price increases
the choice probability in the Discounted store. Second, the
changes in choice probabilities under the RRM framework are
greater than RUM+RRM, which are greater than the RUM
framework (e.g., 1.06 > 1.05 > 0.98 for a 10% decrease in
price). As the price discount increases, this effect becomes more
pronounced. Given either a 10 or 50% reduction in price, more
individuals are predicted to purchase ground beef under the
RRM framework than under the RUM framework. This aligns
with our previous findings that choice attribute elasticities were
more elastic under RRM compared to RUM (see Table 3). It also
implies that understanding which behavioral framework applies
to ground beef purchases could affect policy decision making and
industry response. For example, knowing that choices are more
sensitive to price changes under RRM than RUM, price would not
need to be discounted as much to ensure the same market share.
Thus, a 10% price discount under RUM would achieve the same
change in choice probability as a 9.24% price discount under an
RRM framework.
Third, a decrease in the price of the affected alternative
incentivizes some individuals who were not purchasing ground
beef to purchase ground beef. This is seen by a non-zero value
for No Purchase: −0.43, −0.43, −0.44 under RRM, RUM+RRM,
and RUM, respectively. For a 10% price discount 0.43, 0.43, and
0.44% of respondents would now purchase ground beef under
the different respective frameworks. While the shift is slightly
larger under an RUM framework, the share of the No Purchase
change relative to the total change is ∼45% (40%) of the increase
in choice probability under the RUM (RRM) framework. This
implies that under an RUM framework, more of the change in
choice probability comes from people willing to switch from not
purchasing ground beef to purchasing ground beef rather than
shifting consumption between stores. Given that price is one
product attribute in which stores compete, the results indicate
that one store’s prices have a larger negative/competing effect
on another store under an RRM framework than under an
RUM framework.
We now explore how stores engaging in testing after a food
safety issue would affect consumer choice probabilities. Table 2
reported WTP estimates for Private Testing under both RUM and
RRM frameworks. We take the average private testing premium
between these frameworks, $1.50 per lb., and then add it to the
average price of ground beef in our study and assume that price

the population. These individuals trust government sources and
distrust stores as a source for food safety information.
These consumers account for the performance of non-chosen
alternatives in making choices and attempt to minimize regret
in purchasing potentially risky foods. This appears to align well
with intuition in the context of food safety recalls. For example,
consumers view all food as inherently “safe” when going to
the store to purchase food. Under a situation where a food
safety recall has occurred in the previous month, consumers may
perceive that the likelihood of purchasing “safe” or “healthy” food
is <1. This could cause them to become risk averse and thus
avoid making a food purchasing decision in the event the food
safety issue has not been sufficiently resolved. The consumer
may wish to minimize the regret of making an incorrect food
purchase decision and avoid any potential immediate or longterm effects due to, for example, “food poisoning” 12 . The fact that
the two subgroups appear across different behavioral frameworks
emphasizes the point that correctly modeling consumer decision
making is important to the analysis and evaluation of policy
options. Under stricter assumptions, one could say that 60% of
the individuals in the RUM model were “misclassified,” as they
do not aim to maximize utility when purchasing ground beef
but rather minimize potential regret when making their decision.
A corollary argument could be made for 30% of individuals in
the RRM framework. However, a combination of the two classes
appears to allow for better identification. This is particularly
important given that both models are statistically similar and, as
we will see in the next section, different conclusions for industry
and governmental policy could be drawn.

Price as a Policy Mechanism
We now explore how differences across behavioral frameworks
give rise to different implications for government policy and
industry responses to a given food safety recall. Price is the
primary mechanism that stores can use to incentivize ground
beef purchases. One reason stores discount price after a food
safety recall is to encourage ground beef purchases to offset an
individual’s “food safety risk premium.”
We explore how different price discounts affect the
probabilities of various ground beef purchasing choices. We
do so by using the estimates from Table 4 to calculate shifts in
consumer choice probabilities and total changes given either a 10
or 50% price discount. Since we have an unlabeled hypothetical
choice experiment, we allow the discount to occur separately
in either “Shopping A” or “Shopping B” and then average the
change in choice probabilities. We call the shopping experience
where the discount occurred as Discounted, the shopping
experience where the discount was absent Non-discounted, and
the choose-not-to-shop option No purchase.
12 It

could be possible that a specific consumer could be regret minimizing in
some circumstances but maximize utility in others. Thus, our premise is not that
consumers are either one or other but rather circumstances could arise, in our case
a food recall in the previous month, where consumers wish to minimize regret
for making choices that could lead to potentially negative consequences. This
conclusion appears to align well with the increased sensitivity of U.S. population
toward health and healthy foods in recent years.
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TABLE 5 | Predicted change in choice probabilities given various price discounts.
Random utility maximization

Random regret minimization

Hybrid model

(RUM)

(RRM)

(RUM + RRM)

Change in choice

Total

Change in choice

Total

Change in choice

Total

probability (%)

change (%)

probability (%)

change (%)

probability (%)

change (%)

Panel (a)
10% price discount
Discounteda

0.98

100.00

1.06

100.00

1.05

100.00

Non-discounteda

−0.55

−55.47

−0.63

−59.74

−0.62

−58.75

No purchasea

−0.44

−45.53

−0.43

−40.26

−0.43

−41.25

50% price discount
Discounteda

5.01

100.00

5.31

100.00

5.28

100.00

Non-discounteda

−2.73

−54.39

−3.11

−58.53

−3.06

−57.89

No purchasea

−2.29

−45.61

−2.20

−41.47

−2.23

−42.11

Panel (b)
$3.75 price level
Price increasea

−6.24

−100.00

−6.79

−100.00

−6.67

−100.00

No–price increasea

3.55

56.82

4.20

61.87

4.04

60.51

No purchasea

2.69

43.18

2.59

38.13

2.64

39.49

a Average

effects, author calculations.

We found that the RRM or the hybrid model (RUM
+ RRM) was the preferred model specification. The hybrid
specification shows that about 60% of individuals are regret
minimizer while only 30% maximize utility. If a RUM framework
were used, this would imply 60% of individuals would be
“misclassified.” The model significantly affected direct elasticity
estimates, classification of consumers, and policy/industry price
mechanisms. Results were consistent with previous studies that
the behavioral assumption of random regret appears better suited
to model risky choices having potential losses (for example, food
poisoning). Likewise, results predicted behavioral responses may
differ substantially conditional on behavioral framework.
While the magnitude of difference between behavioral
frameworks is modest, the implied aggregate impact on ground
beef consumption is economically significant. By comparing the
relative discount of E. coli to antibiotic residue, an estimate of
the necessary investment by the industry can be obtained. More
importantly, this study speaks to policy and industry debates
regarding the need to reduce antimicrobial use in livestock
production, which could lead to reduced antibiotic residue in
meat products and ultimately lower antimicrobial resistance in
human health. Since consumers value antibiotic residues <E.
coli contamination, any investment in research and development
to reduce antibiotic residue in beef supply chain should be no
more than 60% of the total research and expenditure of E.
coli. However, given that antibiotic residue is generally known
to not cause immediate health concerns, this estimate is likely
an extreme upper bound. By how much likely depends on
the relative weighting policy makers place on mitigating Class
II recalls relative to Class I recalls given finite food safety
funding. These results provide new, systematic evidence that
both the class of food safety recall and the behavioral framework

is fixed across shopping venues. We then set this as the price
level and observe changes in choice probabilities. We interpret
these changes in choice probabilities as measures of market share
that a store could capture by engaging in additional store food
safety testing. Table 5, panel (b), reports the changes in choice
probabilities. At $3.75 per lb. ($2.25 + $1.50 testing premium),
the choice probability would increase on average by 6%. Note
that the sign is negative for the Discounted store since the price
was raised.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper empirically examined how consumers perceive and
value different classes of food safety recalls. Specifically, we
compared E. coli (Class I) and antibiotic residue (Class II) ground
beef recalls in the prior month. A hypothetical choice experiment
was used where consumers selected among different shopping
experiences and choice attributes that included type of recall,
store format, and private testing. Data were modeled using
two competing behavioral frameworks: the commonly assumed
random utility maximization (RUM) framework and the newer
random regret minimizing (RRM) framework.
Consumers were less likely to purchase ground beef given
an E. coli recall in the prior month compared to an antibiotic
residue recall. This was consistent with our hypothesis that
consumer valuations for food safety recalls are a function of the
relative probability of illness and death. The odds of purchasing
ground beef were higher in supermarkets compared to club
and convenience stores and if the store engages in private food
safety product testing. Results were consistent across behavioral
frameworks and model specifications.
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have substantial impacts on policy decisions and suggest that
strengthening organizational trust has the potential to increase
meaningfully the efficiency of research and development on
antibiotic residue.
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